Another AI test gone awry, U.K. edition. "An agent tried to insert malicious code into an open-source project. In an attempt to get the code approved, the agent engaged in social engineering — creating fake online identities and using them to pressure the project's maintainer to approve the code." More: https://www.aisi.gov.uk/blog/incident-report-unsanctioned-agent-behaviour-during-cyber-testing
Incident Report: unsanctioned agent behaviour during cyber testing | AISI Work
During a routine cyber evaluation, AISI identified an incident in which AI agents took sustained, unsanctioned action directed at real people and organisations. We are disclosing what we found, what it means, and the actions now underway.
Investigating three real-world incidents in our cybersecurity evaluations
In a review of our cybersecurity evaluation transcripts, we found three incidents in which a Claude model reached the internet from within or while interacting with a third-party evaluation environment, and then gained unauthorized access to the real systems of three different organizations. Below we describe what happened, how it happened, and what we’re changing. We encourage other AI labs to perform similar reviews.
Anatomy of a Frontier Lab Agent Intrusion: A Technical Timeline of the July 2026 Incident
We’re on a journey to advance and democratize artificial intelligence through open source and open science.
Cybersecurity Looks Like Proof of Work Now
The UK's AI Safety Institute recently published Our evaluation of Claude Mythos Preview’s cyber capabilities, their own independent analysis of Claude Mythos which backs up Anthropic's claims that it is …
OpenAI’s rogue agents were caught communicating via public wikis
Here we go again... Discovery of a new OpenAI agent message board by Sydney Von Arx, Cormac Slade Byrd, Spencer Kitts, and Thomas Larsen describes the latest accidental cyberattack by …
Unlawful by design: Exposing the human rights costs of generative AI - Amnesty International
This briefing examines how standalone generative AI systems, based on unlawful web scraping, are in conflict with international human rights law (IHRL) and standards through their design, development and deployment. While these technologies promise sophisticated automation and efficiency, they rely on data collection and model training practices that abuse privacy rights, enable discrimination, and threaten […]
Yoshua Bengio | Why are AI agents lying, cheating and coordinating?
A lot has been written about the incidents of the last few months in which AI agents misbehaved in serious ways. They took actions that would be considered as crimes if a human took them, escaped their containment to cheat on assigned tasks while attempting to evade detection, and coordinated toward goals nobody had specified, such as launching cyber attacks. Before concluding what to do about it, it is worth asking why.
OpenAI and Hugging Face partner to address security incident during model evaluation
OpenAI and Hugging Face share early findings from a security incident during AI model evaluation, highlighting advanced cyber capabilities and lessons for defenders.
Vibe Coding Failures: Documented AI Code Incidents
A curated directory of real-world incidents where AI-generated code failed in production.
An update on the scraper situation
Our article 'Fighting the AI scraper bot scourge', published in early 2025, discussed the probl [...]
LLM-Augmented Agent-Based Simulation of Cyber Social Agents
Social media bots are often portrayed as malicious automations to be detected and removed, but automation on social media platforms encompasses a wide spectrum of roles, behaviors, and rhetorical strategies that can shape online discourse in both constructive and destructive ways. This work conceptualizes these automated actors as \textbf{Cyber Social Agents} through a taxonomy of archetypes characterized by their operational tactics and rhetorical style. We integrate this taxonomy into an LLM-driven social simulation, where agents communicate and coordinate in a network environment. Using empirically grounded CSA personas, we simulate heterogeneous online societies to study how agent diversity shapes information diffusion and social influence. Our approach bridges the gap between rule-based agent models and LLM-powered simulations with generated agents that are parameterized from empirical data.
Exposed Moltbook Database Let Anyone Take Control of Any AI Agent on the Site
'It exploded before anyone thought to check whether the database was properly secured.'
AI Cybersecurity After Mythos: The Jagged Frontier
When AISLE tested Mythos's showcase vulnerabilities on small, cheap, open-weights models, most found the same bugs. Here's what that means for cyber.
A quote from Daniel Stenberg
The challenge with AI in open source security has transitioned from an AI slop tsunami into more of a ... plain security report tsunami. Less slop but lots of reports. …
What happened after 2,000 people tried to hack my AI assistant — Fernando Irarrázaval
I built hackmyclaw.com, where anyone could email Fiu, my OpenClaw assistant, and try to make it leak the contents of a secrets.env file.
Agentic manual testing - Agentic Engineering Patterns
Agentic manual testing - Agentic Engineering Patterns